Improving training officer job fit: a qualitative and cost analysis by Lupo, Kyle J. & Groves, Lucas M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2018-03
Improving training officer job fit: a qualitative
and cost analysis
Lupo, Kyle J.; Groves, Lucas M.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58329
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.













Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
IMPROVING TRAINING OFFICER JOB FIT: 




Kyle J. Lupo 




Thesis Advisor:  Jesse Cunha 
Co-Advisor: Matthew Larkin 
  
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2018 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
IMPROVING TRAINING OFFICER JOB FIT: A QUALITATIVE AND COST 
ANALYSIS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Kyle J. Lupo and Lucas M. Groves 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number NPS.2018.0020-IR-
EP7-A. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Within the Surface Warfare community, the U.S. Navy has significant retention problems, which have 
been ward off by drastic bonuses paid to its officers. A phone survey of training officers (TRAINOs) 
aboard cruisers and destroyers was conducted, resulting in a 40% participation rate from the population. 
Only 30.3% selected the TRAINO billet as their number one billet choice, and 55.7% planned on getting 
out of the Navy. A majority felt the training received was inadequate. 
This led us to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, with three courses of action (COA). First, the status quo 
shows no impact on costs or added benefits. COA 2, adding an additional TRAINO billet to be filled by a 
Human Resources (HR) Officer, increased costs by $600,837 per month while COA 3, swapping an HR 
Officer into the surface warfare officer (SWO) TRAINO billet, increased costs by $21,829 per month. 
There were significant non-monetary benefits to both COA 2 and 3, including increases in training 
proficiency and in job fit for both the HR and SWO communities. These non-monetary benefits were most 
significant in COA 2, resulting in adding an HR Officer to CRUDES platforms being the most beneficial 
COA. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
job fit, Training Officer, Navy, CBA, survey.  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
51 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
IMPROVING TRAINING OFFICER JOB FIT: 
A QUALITATIVE AND COST ANALYSIS 
 
 
Kyle J. Lupo 
Lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve 
B.S., Western Michigan University, 2010 
 
Lucas M. Groves 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., University of Arizona, 2010 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 























Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 




Within the Surface Warfare community, the U.S. Navy has significant retention 
problems, which have been ward off by drastic bonuses paid to its officers. A phone 
survey of training officers (TRAINOs) aboard cruisers and destroyers was conducted, 
resulting in a 40% participation rate from the population. Only 30.3% selected the 
TRAINO billet as their number one billet choice, and 55.7% planned on getting out of the 
Navy. A majority felt the training received was inadequate. 
This led us to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, with three courses of action (COA). 
First, the status quo shows no impact on costs or added benefits. COA 2, adding an 
additional TRAINO billet to be filled by a Human Resources (HR) Officer, increased 
costs by $600,837 per month while COA 3, swapping an HR Officer into the surface 
warfare officer (SWO) TRAINO billet, increased costs by $21,829 per month. There 
were significant non-monetary benefits to both COA 2 and 3, including increases in 
training proficiency and in job fit for both the HR and SWO communities. These non-
monetary benefits were most significant in COA 2, resulting in adding an HR Officer to 
CRUDES platforms being the most beneficial COA. 
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The United States Navy must ensure that its fleet is prepared and properly 
manned for any scenario at a moment’s notice. The Navy aims to incorporate regular 
revisions of its standard operating procedures to improve upon its training cycles, 
processes, and requirements. Yet, in practice, training cycles become repetitive, 
personnel are not afforded the time to attend beneficial or required schools, and personnel 
qualifications are not maintained. At the crux of these personnel pitfalls lies the Navy’s 
training programs. This research examines alternate manning schemes among Training 
Officers (TRAINOs) on cruiser and destroyer (CRUDES) ships in an effort to increase 
efficiency and retention. This research analyzes whether a specialized officer would 
perform better in the role of Training Officer than the currently serving Surface Warfare 
Officer. 
Across the fleet, the Navy struggles to retain its best sailors and officers who self-
select to separate, while simultaneously forcing the separation of the sailors who fail to 
meet prescribed standards. In an effort to retain its talented and competent Surface 
Warfare Officers, the Navy should examine officer job fit. Doing so allows the right 
officer to be placed in the role best suited to his or her abilities. This research studies job-
fit analysis with regard to CRUDES Training Officers. CRUDES Training Officers are 
typically Lieutenant Junior Grade Surface Warfare Officers who possess little experience 
in the duties and responsibilities of the Training Officer. This research design identifies 
whether or not the role of Training Officer, filled by an alternate officer designator, 
increases sailor satisfaction, qualification adherence, and retention through increased job 
fit. The research explores second- and third-order effects of the potential changes and 
compares, using a cost analysis, the results of the alternative manning scheme on the 
status quo.  
Our research addresses two major questions. The first question concentrates on 
whether there is an officer designator more successful at training than the others. In order 
to answer such a broad and subjective question, several smaller questions must first be 
examined. Questions of this nature cannot be answered simply and succinctly. Subjective 
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in nature, these questions require evidence and research of their own to be answered. To 
capture these questions, we utilized an inclusive survey. Our survey includes a sample of 
all CRUDES Training Officers through objective and subjective questioning. The survey 
design incorporates questions developed from review of job-fit literature. The second 
question paramount to this research addresses the monetary and non-monetary savings 
incurred by the Navy with a shift in manpower that involves billeting human resource 
officers in all CRUDES Training Officer billets. In order to identify the costs associated 
with this shift in manning, we analyze the tangible monetary cost associated with bonuses 
and pay as well as the intangibles such as increased retention from higher job satisfaction 
due to job fit increases. 
To identify the monetary effects we conduct a cost-benefit analysis of three 
possible manning schemes herein referred to as courses of action (COA). The first COA 
identified centers around maintaining the status quo with no alterations to the manning 
structure. The second COA adds human resource Training Officers to CRUDES ships 
while reallocating the SWOs into other billets onboard. Lastly, the third COA replaces 
SWO CRUDES Training Officers with human resource officers in a one for one billet 
swap resulting in no increase in net personnel.  
Our thesis analyzes the job fit of TRAINOs and the applicability of an alternative 
manning scheme aboard CRUDES. Starting this research endeavor with these platforms 
provides the basis for determining the transferability of this manning structure to other 
platforms such as amphibious ships and littoral combat ships. Ultimately, the scope of 
this analysis will expand and encompass additional facets of the Navy to include its 
applicability within naval aviation and other operational environments. Limiting the 
initial scope of this research to these two platforms allows for more direct accessibility to 
these Training Officers at a critical career decision point of their careers. For this 
research, the costs and benefits analysis remains limited to the Surface Warfare 
community and the human resource community.  
In order to obtain conclusions and develop a correlation between ideas and 
hypotheses absent of random trial and error, we establish certain assumptions. The 
subjective nature of the surveys and cost benefits further drives the need to make inherent 
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assumptions. Our baseline assumption states that job satisfaction will correlate to job 
retention directly and positively. Without this simple assumption, there would be no other 
influencer, other than monetary, to create higher retention. Another assumption 
establishes the baseline idea that the Navy desires to increase its retention rate and 
concurrently tries to increase morale. The final assumption presumes that the Navy has a 
desire for its employees to feel fulfilled by their work.  
Analyzing the personal and monetary benefits of increased job fit as well as the 
retention benefits associated with a perceived increase in job-fit can increase the 
readiness of the entire fleet exponentially. This research produces three main benefits. 
One benefit includes an increase in the morale of sailors and officers in the Navy by 
identifying higher job-fit roles.  Another benefit involves an increase in the retention rates 
of officers serving in TRAINO roles in both the SWO and HR communities due to higher 
satisfaction in their work. Finally, the third benefit is a potential increase in cost savings 
due to an increase in retention and the following decrease in bonuses resulting from that 
increase in retention. Each benefit on its own is a worthwhile pursuit and provides 
valuable personnel insight and retention information to the Navy. However, the 
combination of the three benefits provides simple viable solutions to the Navy’s 
retention, morale, and training issues. 
In order to establish a baseline for determining whether a more appropriate 
designator should hold the billet of Training Officer, we conducted a phone survey of 33 
Training Officers onboard CRUDES vessels. Analysis of the respondents’ answers 
highlights the determination that there are issues involved with the Training Officer 
course itself. Survey results demonstrate that 42.4% of the respondents believe HR 
Officers should fill the Training Officer billet instead of a SWO. Studies of job-fit 
throughout history consistently show its impact on both job retention and job satisfaction. 
A survey result with such a large percentage in agreement indicates the established belief 
that it is beneficial to put an HR Officer into the TRAINO billet. That being said, the HR 
Officer cannot simply replace the SWO because the SWO also has many watchstanding 
positions to include officer of the deck (OOD) and command duty officer (CDO). 
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Instead, we recommend adding an additional billet to the ship manning document to be 
filled by an HR Officer.  
We developed three possible COA to analyze as alternative manning options. The 
recommended COA is to add a billet to each ship. This billet will be filled by a Human 
Resource Officer who has expertise in training and manning and who will serve as the 
TRAINO. The SWO who was previously billeted as TRAINO will remain onboard and 
will fill another billet as needed. This option adds a critical expertise by including the HR 
Officer and enhances the SWO community by freeing up an experienced officer to fill 
another crucial SWO billet. This option does involve increasing the size of the Navy by 
83 officers, but it is the most cost effective officer community to increase due to its lack 




II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Navy designs its officer corps for various missions and responsibilities all of 
which require a broad range of skill sets and an inherent strong basis of knowledge. The 
Navy assigns each officer an identifying numerical designator to categorize the distinct 
abilities and skills desired of each. These officer designators are further divided into two 
broad categories: Restricted Line (RL) and Unrestricted Line (URL). Restricted Line 
Officers establish specialized officers whose skills align to fill clearly defined roles to 
include doctors, lawyers, human resource officers, chaplains, and public affairs officers. 
These officers specialize in specific roles and will often serve their entire career without 
leaving their assigned fields. On the contrary, Unrestricted Line Officers by design are 
trained to fill multiple roles within broader fields of work. URL officers include aviators, 
surface officers, submariners, and special forces officers. Surface Warfare Officers 
(SWO) are naval officers assigned to operate surface ships, but they fill a variety of roles 
within that field. SWOs can be assigned to work in any field from engineering to combat 
systems. By designing the SWO community in this method, the officers are inherently 
generalists lacking the experience to master any specific role and instead develop only a 
moderate level of knowledge in each role. Doing this allows the SWO community to flex 
its officers into a variety of roles and can create an internal redundancy in wartime 
situations. While there are benefits to a non-specialized workforce, there are also negative 
impacts to job-fit, which ultimately lead to retention issues. 
Job fit is the connection between the abilities of a person and the demands of the 
job (Lin, 2014). Ideally, any organization strives to maximize the amount of fit between a 
worker and their job. Lin surveyed employees (212) of companies in the insurance 
industry because there is an emphasis on teamwork in order to determine if there was a 
correlation in job fit and job performance. Lin’s research identified a correlation between 
the employee’s ability and the complexity of the job with the workers’ performance. This 
finding invites us to look at the Navy’s manning doctrine and determine whether job-fit 
potential has been maximized. Determining the best way to measure job fit within an 
organization remains a very challenging task. Lin used a survey to determine the extent 
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of job fit; Kristof-Brown (2005), on the other hand, used a meta-analysis to measure the 
effects of job-fit on specific areas of employment. Kristof- Brown used 172 published 
articles with 836 effect sizes “indicating the broad generalizability of the relationships 
across situations” (Kristof-Brown, p.281, 2005). The size and scale of this meta-analysis 
covers an extensive amount of job-fit literature and analyzed the multiple results to find 
that the results are similar regardless of the situation. Kristof-Brown wanted to determine 
the impact of job fit with an employee’s desire to quit, their actual performance, and 
commitment to the organization. The Navy can benefit from research utilizing similar 
strategy for determining the fit as Lin did, and then examining the effect of fit as Kristof-
Brown did. If there is potential for the Navy to increase job fit between sailors and their 
roles, there is potential to increase retention and performance. Kristof-Brown’s research 
identified some correlations in her study of job fit. She determined that increased job fit 
leads to increased retention, higher commitment to the organization, and an increase in 
job satisfaction and productivity. 
Many jobs within the Navy require specific officer designations: for example, 
only pilots should fly and only Medical Officers should be perform surgery. Other jobs, 
however, involve less structured in their area of responsibility. For example, officers 
across any designation can fill recruiter positions. Currently, Training Officers remain 
one of these less structured roles within the Navy. The Navy only divides Training 
Officers into two categories, afloat and ashore. Afloat Training Officers coordinate 
comprehensive training programs, de-conflict training requirements, develops and 
maintain required schools’ lists, and coordinate training orders (United States Navy, 
2018). On ships, a SWO fills the billet of Training Officer; in aviation squadrons, an 
aviator is the designated Training Officer. Currently, HR Officers fill Training Officer 
billets aboard aircraft carriers and have the responsibility to manage training and manning 
for a ship with over 6000 crewmembers in comparison to the crew of roughly 300 
onboard CRUDES. The Navy has previously identified the benefit of employing a 
Human Resource Officer as a Training Officer on larger ships. The officers in these 
billets will not be surveyed for the purposes of this assessment due to difference amongst 
designators and the degree of responsibilities.  
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The Center for Naval Analysis looked into the Surface Warfare community and 
released a retention report by Ann Parcell. Parcell (2008) calculated cumulative 
continuation rates (CCR) for various officer communities over the critical periods in their 
careers. Determining the continuation rates for an officer community attempts to identify 
if there are retention problems within that designator. Parcell’s research determined that 
there is a continuation rate of roughly 31% in the critical time of a SWO’s development. 
SWOs in the 3- and 9-year mark of their careers decide at approximately two separate 
occasions whether they intend to continue their careers. The first of these two decisions 
come at the end of their second tour, which is the period right after their potential tour as 
a Training Officer. The potential lack of job-fit between SWOs and Training Officers 
could contribute to the poor continuation rates within the community.  
The Training Officer billet holder assumes a variety of duties and tasks. Each ship 
may be organized differently with varying crew sizes and functions; however, the 
Training Officer job is consistent with the exception of manning the ship. CRUDES 
Training Officer’s primary duties consist of scheduling required schools for ship’s crew; 
developing training plans to include ship’s training cycle; and ensuring proper manning 
for all phases of training. SWOs typically have skill sets that focus on seamanship, 
combat systems and engineering. They are given training on the TRAINO duties at a one-
weeklong remote course and their proficiency is reliant on the knowledge gained from 
this course. Human Resource Officers serve in specific core competencies that focus on 
manning, and training development. They are recruited into the HR community due to 
their proficiency and or potential in fields related to training and planning. Human 
Resource Officers have proven their abilities are a high fit for Training Officer billets by 
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III. SURVEY OF TRAINING OFFICERS 
A. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
We conducted surveys of all TRAINOs aboard CRUDES in order to gain insight 
on their attitudes towards retention, job satisfaction, billet preference, and job 
performance. Due to time constraints, narrowing the sample population to just those 
billeted to a CRUDES provided the best insight into answering our research questions. In 
addition, CRUDES ships represent the majority of the surface fleet and have the most 
diverse mission sets amongst platforms. Our thesis will aggregate only the opinions of 
officers aboard CRUDES not taking into account larger platforms such amphibious ships.  
We chose to conduct a phone survey in order to provide the most accurate raw 
information; additionally, we believed that phone interviews would result in the highest 
response rate. After obtaining a list of 83 TRAINOs from the junior SWO detailer, we 
conducted a phone survey to determine appropriate job fit for that specific billet. This list 
included all CRUDES in an operational status, representing the entire sample population.  
 We surveyed current TRAINOs rather than officers who have filled the billet in 
the past in order to eliminate bias of his or her pre-determined decision regarding his or 
her career. Those who have previously filled the TRAINO position have already made 
their retention decision and would thus have a certain degree of bias towards questions 
related to the TRAINO position. Additionally, with regard to retention and job-fit, Navy 
retention bonuses have frequently fluctuated throughout the years; consequently, attitudes 
may inevitably shift throughout the years. Because of this, we restricted our sample to 
only those who have concurrently served as a TRAINO.  
The survey consisted of directed, structured questions without the option for 
follow-up questions from interview subjects or survey administrators. This technique 
allows for integrity of the survey utilizing the same set of questions asked in the same 
manner to all participants. The objective involved a survey of all 83 CRUDES TRAINOs 
with the hopes a vast majority would volunteer to take the survey. Prior to beginning the 
survey, all 83 ships were randomly selected and ordered for the calling process just in 
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case the window to interview closed in order to allow for sufficient time for analysis. 
Appendix A shows our solicitation letter. 
B. SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Survey Questions 
The first set of questions inquired about the duration of billet tenure of each 
participant, the participant’s second tour wish list, and the reasoning behind choosing the 
most desired option. This provides insight on whether or not SWOs request to fill the 
TRAINO billet and to gather opinions of billets that are more favorable than the 
TRAINO position. 
Next, a series of questions relating to their opinions on the probability they will 
promote to the next rank based upon holding the current billet of TRAINO as opposed to 
the probabilities compared to other billet options. This question would have little impact 
on O-2s because they have a high likelihood, practically guaranteed, of promoting to O-3. 
However, by asking this question to O-3s, we will be able to draw conclusions on their 
attitudes and perceptions of promotability based on holding various billets. Also, in this 
set of questions, we ask whether he or she will fill another shore and afloat tour as a 
SWO. This will give us insight into whether or not the TRAINO plans to stay in the Navy 
or SWO community. 
Questions 12 through 16 are associated with the department-head retention bonus 
(DHRB) for the SWO community. These questions highlight what impact the DHRB has 
on participants’ plans to stay in the Navy. It also addresses the impact possible future 
changes to the bonus could have on the SWO community.  
The demographic set of questions asked about their years of service, 
commissioning source, watch standing positions, collateral duties, prior experience, and 
last deployments. These questions aim to address potential correlation with other 
responses in the survey.  
Lastly, the subjective questions asked specifically about the TRAINO billet. 
These questions were designed intentionally to elicit participants’ attitudes towards the 
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actual training he or she received prior to assuming the duties as a TRAINO. These 
questions also aimed to elicit feedback from the officers concerning the potential for a 
different designator within the Navy to fill this particular billet. Table 1 provides an 
outline of the specific questions asked of the participants. 
Table 1.   Phone Survey Questions 
1. How long have you been in the Training Officer billet? 
2. Please list your second tour wishlist for billets in order, not including location or 
platform.  
3. Why did you choose [#1 choice] as your #1 choice? 
4. With what probability from 0-100 do you believe you will be promoted to the 
next rank?  
 
Now I’d like you to imagine that you were in several different SWO billets other than 
TRAINO, including AUXO, DCA, ORDO, MPO, and NAV. 
 
5. If you were in the AUXO billet, with what probability do you believe you would be 
promoted to the next rank? 
6. If you were in the DCA billet, with what probability do you believe you would be 
promoted to the next rank? 
7. If you were in the ORDO billet, with what probability do you believe you would be 
promoted to the next rank? 
8. If you were in the MPO billet, with what probability do you believe you would be 
promoted to the next rank? 
9. If you were in the NAV billet, with what probability do you believe you would be 
promoted to the next rank? 
 
 
10. With what probability do you believe you will accept another tour as a SWO? 
11. With what probability do you believe you will accept another Afloat tour as a 
SWO? 
 
Currently the SWO DHRB is $105K for first time screeners. 
 
12. With what probability would you remain in the SWO community if you were not 
offered a Department Head Retention Bonus (SWO DHRB)? 
13. With what probability would you remain in the SWO community if that was 
reduced or taken away completely? 




Assuming the SWO DHRB is $105K, 
 
15. With what probability do you believe you will remain in the Navy until 
retirement? 
16. Imagine you had received your number one billet choice on your second tour 
instead of this TRAINO billet. In that case, with what probability would you remain 





17. How long have you been on active duty? 
18. What was your commissioning source? 
19. What is your current primary watch standing positions inport? 
20. What is your current primary watch standing positions underway? 
21. How many collateral duties do you have? 
22. Do you have prior enlisted experience? If so, how many years? 
23. Did you work professionally prior to joining the Navy (i.e., not summer jobs 
during college)? 
24. When was your last deployment? 





26. On a scale [1-10], how effective do you feel you are as a TRAINO? 
27. Do you feel your abilities are better suited for another billet as a SWO? 
28. Do you believe SWOs should fill afloat TRAINO billets? 
29. Do you think there should be a separate officer designator other than SWO 
specifically for TRAINO billets? 











31. What training did you receive prior to assuming the duties? Select as many as 
apply 
a. Training Officer Course, CIN:G-7B-0200 
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b. OJT/Turnover 
c. No Turnover 
d. Prior Experience (Worked in Admin, prior enlisted, etc.) 
32. What skills do you believe are lacking in the training to make you an effective 
TRAINO? 
33. As a SWO, how well trained are you to be a TRAINO? [scale 1-10] 
 34. What percentage of your time is spent on doing TRAINO tasks compared to 
maintaining SWO qualifications? 
 
2. Data Analysis 
Table 2 displays summary statistics of the respondents. We surveyed 33 out of 83 
TRAINOs in the population group, representing approximately 40% of the desired 
grouping. Also, we reached an additional 23 TRAINOs via email who wished to 
participate in the survey, but lacked phone capabilities due to operational commitments. 
This would have brought our participate rate to 67%. On average, the TRAINOs 
surveyed served in that billet for number of 12.909 (6.934) months and had an average of 
4.553 years of service (2.975). The latter statistic had a relatively high standard deviation 
due to the fact that two officers in the sample size had over 10 years of service which 
inflated the average. A majority of the sample was male (64%), O-2 and below (57.6%), 
and had deployed as TRAINO of the ship (57.6%). Respondents encompassed a mix of 
commissioning sources to include Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) (48.5%), 
United States Naval Academy (USNA) (27.3%), Officer Candidate School (OCS) 
(21.2%), and Seaman-to-Admiral-21 (STA-21) (3.0%). Of the respondents, 12.1% had 







Table 2.   Summary Statistics  
 
    *Inflated by 4 prior enlisted 
 
With regard to the TRAINOs second tour wishlist for billets (regardless of 
location and platform), 10 selected TRAINO as their number one (30.3%). The common 
response as to why TRAINO was chosen involved a desire to go to Dahlgren and attend 
the AEGIS Officer Course while also not having to lead a division. The school the 
TRAINOs referenced does not directly relate to the duties and responsibilities required of 






O-2 and below 0.58
# of months in TRAINO billet 12.91 (6.93)







# of collateral duties 2.67 (1.76)
Prior enlisted 0.12
Prior professional experience 0.12
Deployed as TRAINO 0.58
# of respondents 33
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All of the O-2s surveyed believe they will be promoted to the next rank, 
regardless of what billet he or she would be filling. On average, O-3s believe they have a 
62.8% of being promoted. The only billet that raised the chances of being promoted other 
than TRAINO was navigator (NAV) position. Also, on average, the respondents have a 
62.7% chance of taking another billet as a SWO (shore tour) and 44.3% chance of taking 
another afloat tour. This estimates that a majority of the respondents (55.7%) do not plan 
to stay in the Navy. On average, when asked if the DHRB was taken away or reduced, the 
respondents had a decrease in probability of staying in the SWO community, 32.5 % and 
37.3% respectively. While this is not the average of the entire SWO community, it does 
pose some concerns for the Navy. This low percentage would mean the Navy would need 
to continue offering those large bonuses, and potentially alter them in some way to raise 
the retention rates amongst TRAINOs. 
On average, TRAINOs rated their effectiveness as 7.36 out of 10. However, 12 
respondents (36.3%) believed his or her abilities were better suited for another billet as a 
SWO. When asked specifically if SWOs should fill the afloat TRAINO billet, 84.8% 
responded “yes”. Contrary, when given a choice of designators to fill the TRAINO billet, 
54.5% selected SWO, 42.4% for HR, and 3% for supply. The respondent who answered 
“supply” did not know what the HR community was.  
When asked how well trained the TRAINO was to fill the billet, the average 
response was 4.91 on a scale from one to ten. A majority felt the training he or she 
received was inadequate. The specific training the TRAINOs referred to was the Training 
Officer Course, CIN: G-7B-0200, a 4-5 day course in San Diego or Norfolk. This 
correlated to the response of 69% for the average amount of time spent doing TRAINO 
related tasks as opposed to maintaining SWO qualifications and watchstanding. 
According to the respondents, many skills were lacking in the training in order to make 
them a more effective TRAINO. 
Many of the TRAINOs (90%) are not trained effectively on computer-based 
management systems such as the fleet management and planning system (FLTMPS), 
corporate enterprise training activity resource system (CeTARS), billet based detailing 
(BBD), and relational administrative data management (RADM). When used effectively, 
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these management systems provide the TRAINO with useful information such as what 
critical Navy enlisted classification (NEC) codes are needed on the ship. Without the 
critical NECs, the ship may not be able to do certain mission sets. 
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IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A. CBA METHODOLOGY 
The congressional budget is an unavoidable binding constraint preventing the 
Navy from obtaining its maximum effectiveness. No different from any of the military 
branches, the Navy receives a predetermined budget limiting the amount of resources 
available to achieve its missions. These resources, namely money and people, are quickly 
used to cover a vast spectrum of responsibilities. Employees must be paid and equipment 
must be maintained, new ships and aircraft must be built to replace outdated ones, and 
research must be done to advance our technology faster than our adversaries. All these 
responsibilities place a large burden on the priority setting of the Navy’s budget. To make 
any changes to the resourcing structure, the Navy must perform a complete cost analysis 
that can both justify its resourcing decisions and potentially save the government money 
at the same time. 
Cost-benefit analyses are an effective tool to compare the impacts of different 
courses of action. We have identified different characteristics associated with the 
potential success of a TRAINO in the U.S. Navy; by doing so, the results show multiple 
courses of action to adjust Training Officer manning to build the most efficient and 
organizationally beneficial structure possible. In accordance with a memo from the Office 
of Management and Budget (1992), the United States governmental instruction on how to 
perform a cost-benefit analysis, consideration of all benefits, including those benefits 
incurred by the public for any potential improvements in their quality of life. Many of the 
inputs considered in our analysis do not have direct monetary value and others have 
vastly different values for each member. OMB94 also dictates that all potential and 
reasonable inputs are identified, including both the direct and indirect costs and benefits 
that affect all members of society. To do this, a variety of costs will be addressed 
including: active duty personnel standard pay and bonuses, the probability of retention, 
and the cost associated with loss in proficiency in one’s primary job role. 
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1. Courses of Action 
Identifying and defining the proper courses of action can be one of the most 
important pieces to conducting a cost analysis. Indicated below are the three COAs we 
compare as well as a description of each potential alternative manning option: 
1. SWO O-2 in afloat Training Officer billets (Status Quo). This COA does 
not alter the current manning scheme. CRUDES Training Officers are 
primarily Lieutenant Junior Grade (O-2) Surface Warfare Officers. On 
rare occasions, some Training Officers are promoted at the end of the tour 
and become Lieutenants (O-3). Since this is the manning system currently 
used in the Navy, it should be considered as a viable option. 
2. HR O-2 in afloat Training Officer billets (Addition). This COA consists of 
adding a Human Resource Officer to all CRUDES ships as Training 
Officers, allowing the SWOs who previously filled that billet to fill more 
desired and SWO specific billets. The SWOs who previously filled the 
Training Officer billet will remain onboard and alleviate the 
overburdening of the SWO community.  
3. HR O-2 in afloat Training Officer billets (Swap). This COA replaces 
SWO Training Officers with Human Resource Officers. This removes a 
SWO from the ship and fills the gapped billet with a Human Resource 
Officer. 
Throughout this cost-benefit analysis, we will be operating under some very 
generic assumptions regarding career paths (e.g., promotability, pay structure, and 
bonuses). These assumptions include: 
 All officers receive the same base pay, ceteris paribus 
 SWO Training Officers are second tour division officers 
 SWOs who continue past their second tour have signed up for retention 
bonuses  
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 SWO and HR Training Officers receive sea pay  
 SWO Training Officers are self-selecting to separate from the Navy after 
their second tour at a rate of 37.3%, and after their third tour at 55.7% 
 HR Officers receive no retention bonuses 
2. Inputs for CBA 
One of the most important steps in conducting a complete cost analysis involves 
identifying all the factors that have a direct effect on the stakeholders. Not all of these 
inputs have measurable effects, and thus we have to make assumptions on their value in 
order to include them. Some of the inputs are direct and affect the outcome on their own 
while others are peripheral effects and must be included as a result of a choice. We 
identified eleven inputs that will need to be considered in order to develop a 
recommendation. These inputs are independent variables to which we will analyze their 
effect on each COA. Based on the analysis, a monetary value, either positive or negative, 
is assigned to each input in the final analysis.  
B. CBA RESULTS 
In this section, we identify the methods and calculations used to determine either 
the value or the effect of each input. Each input is monetized to the maximum extent 
possible. Five of the inputs cannot be monetized; instead, we measure the magnitude of 
their positive or negative impacts. A positive impact correlates to an increase in benefit 
and a negative impact correlates to a decrease in benefits. 
Input 1 Billet Change HR: In order to determine how many billets are created 
for Human Resource Officers under each Course of Action, we first had to determine 
how many billets for the Training Officer position are available to be filled. In our first 
COA, the status quo, there are 83 Training Officer Billets on CRUDES ships. Since COA 
1, involves no change to the current situation, there is zero change in the number of 
Human Resource Officer billets. In COA 2 and 3 however, those 83 billets assigned to 
SWO Training Officers are now assigned to Human Resource Officers. There are 83 new 
billets created for Lieutenant Junior Grade Human Resource Officers created under the 
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second and third COAs. The growth in the Human Resources community is the most 
effective community to grow due to lack of retention bonuses.  
Input 2 Billet Change SWO: Under the first course of action, there is be no 
change in the number of billets for Surface Warfare Officers. COA 1 being the status quo 
does not alter any billets for any designator. However, the second and third COAs do 
change the number of billets for the SWO community. While COA 2 does not create any 
new billets for Surface Warfare Officers, it does allow the previous 83 Surface Warfare 
Officer who previously filled the Training Officer billets to fill billets that are potentially 
undermanned. This new availability of personnel is monetized through its impact on 
retention and costs later in our research. Under the third COA, there is a reduction in 
SWO billets by 83. This is because the Human Resource Officers replaced the SWOs 
onboard their ships.  
Input 3 Personnel Cost: Personnel costs are determined using current 2018 
military pay and the average of the basic allowance for housing (BAH) in San Diego and 
Norfolk. These two areas have the highest concentrations of afloat Training Officer 
billets. The monthly personnel costs are $4,696 for basic pay and $2,017 average BAH. 
We take into consideration a typical O-2 will have three years of service when calculating 
pays. We then multiply the sum of all the personnel costs by the 83 Training Officer 
billets. Under the first COA, there is a total personnel cost of $579,008/month which is 
the monetized value of paying the 83 Training Officers. COA 2, with the addition of 83 
Human Resource Officers doubles the personnel costs to $1,158,016/month, which is the 
value of the Human Resource Officers and the SWOs that are now filling other billets. 
The third COA consists of replacing SWOs with HR Officers maintaining the number of 
personnel as the status quo, giving us a personnel cost of $579,008/month.  
Input 4 Training Officer Proficiency: The proficiency of the Training Officers 
on ships relies on two major factors: experience and knowledge. Under the first COA, 
second tour Surface Warfare Officers are the filling the Training Officer billet. Second 
tour SWOs have on average 3 years of experience, which is confined to the surface 
community, leaving their experience and knowledge levels (outside of surface duties) 
relatively low. COAs 2 and 3, offers a moderate increase in knowledge and in experience. 
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HR Officers, due to their diverse backgrounds, have increased knowledge and 
experience, and specialty in training and procedures in the Navy. The increase in 
experience increases the efficiency of all the duties associated with the Training Officer 
billet.  
Input 5 HR Retention: Identifying the impact of these courses of action on HR 
Officers retention is very difficult to determine. While the creation of new operational 
training billets is a high-fit job, many HR Officers often transfer into the community due 
to limitations that prevent them from serving in an operational capacity. Other HR 
Officers compete for Training Officer billets on surface ships so increasing the 
availability would increase retention. Due to the very individual dependent impacts on 
these COAs, we have assigned them a neutral value, splitting the impact from those that 
desire the Training Officer billets and those that do not. There should be no long-term 
effect on HR Officer retention in any of these COAs.  
Input 6 SWO retention: According to current literature and research, the 
retention rate for SWOs at this decision point in their career, is 31% (Parcell, 2008). 
Using this as a baseline retention rate we can determine that under course of action one, 
the retention rate would remain at 31%. This retention rate is extremely low and is one of 
the main reasons the surface community has determined it needs the department head 
retention bonus (DHRB). By placing Human Resource Officers into the Training Officer 
billets, it allows second tour SWOs to fill more high-fitting jobs in their own 
communities. By allowing SWOs to fill the high-fit jobs, they will be less likely to self-
select out of the community at the rates they currently are. Under the second COA, there 
is a significant increase in SWO retention. This increase in SWO retention will have 
significant implications on bonuses identified in input 8. However, COA 3 has a neutral 
effect on SWO retention. The increased job fit offered under COA 3 increases retention, 
while the loss of 83 SWO places undue burden on the community.  
Input 7 HR Bonus: Under COA 1, a Human Resource Officer receives no 
bonuses or special pay. There will always be extenuating circumstance where special pay 
is authorized, but due to the inconsistency and rarity of these events, we ignored them for 
this research. When calculating the bonus that would be assigned to Human Resource 
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Officers, under COA 2 and 3, we must first identify the potential bonuses available to HR 
Officers by placing them on a surface ship. The primary bonus for HR Officers under 
these COA is the addition of sea pay. In order to monetize this bonus, we take the dollar 
value of sea pay for one Lieutenant Junior Grade ($263) and multiple it by the number of 
Training Officers that would now be HR Officers, which is 83. Once this calculation is 
made, we are able to determine that the increase in bonuses assigned to HR Officers is 
$21,829/month.  
Input 8 SWO Bonus: Under the status quo, SWO bonuses will not be affected in 
any way. All special pay and allowances will still be afforded to each Training Officer. 
With 83 SWO Training Officers, each will receive their assigned sea pay. Sea pay for a 
Lieutenant Junior Grade with three years of cumulative sea duty is $263, which we 
multiplied by the number of Training Officers (83), to identify a total bonus assigned 
under COA 1 as $21,829/month. In COA 2, the sea pay bonus will be doubled due to the 
addition of 83 Human Resource Officers. The inclusion of HR Officers brings the sea pay 
total to $43,658/month. The inclusion of Human Resource Officers into the Training 
Officer billet will not reduce the number of Lieutenant Junior Grade SWOs on the ship. 
However, due to the inclusion of Human Resource Officers, and the noted increase in 
SWO retention, identified in input 6, the Department Head Retention Bonus (DHRB) for 
all SWOs is be reduced. COA 3 alternatively, removes 83 SWO Training Officers and 
inserts 83 HR Officers. This change results in 83 HR Officers receiving sea pay at 
$21,829/month. It also reduces the number of SWO Officers in the community, which 
ultimately requires an increase in the Department Head Retention Bonus offered to 
SWOs at this point in their career. The magnitude of the change in the Department Head 
Retention Bonus requires further research. 
Input 9 Job fit SWO: The first course of action offers a low level of job fit to 
Surface Warfare Officers. With a limited number of opportunities for second tour SWOs, 
detailers are forced to assign these sailors to the Training Officer billet, which is far 
removed from the typical duties of seamanship, in which SWOs demonstrate their 
expertise. This lower level of job fit has a secondary impact on retention. SWOs who are 
taken out of their chosen roles to serve in a Training Officer role are more likely to 
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separate from the Navy prior to another sea tour (55.7 from survey results). Under the 
second COA, SWO job fit is significantly increased due to the removal of the low-fit 
Training Officer billet. This increase in job fit also causes a slight increase in retention 
within the SWO community, due to the relieved burden of undermanning. The 
community would now have enough Junior Officer to man crucial billets that have gone 
unmanned in previous years, and would afford the junior SWOs a greater range of 
experience within their specialty. COA 3 offers the same increase in job-it as COA 2 
does, but since there are less SWOs in COA 3, the increase in job fit also brings increased 
workload.  
Input 10 Job fit HR: Because Human Resource Officers are currently filling 
billets that match specifically to one of their four core competencies (recruiting, 
development, management, requirements), their job fit is very high initially. COA 1 
would nether increase or decrease the job fit of Human Resource Officers because their 
high fit billets are all still available to them. COA 2 and 3 however, would increase the 
job fit of every HR Officer, including those not assigned to the Training Officer billets. 
By adding 83 more high-fit billets, detailer will be able to assign individual officers into 
jobs that fit their specific desires, rather than having less billets available and causing 
conflict and tension to be assigned to these coveted billets. These billets are identified as 
high-fit because they explicitly meet the requirement of the development core 
competency of HR Officers. Ultimately, even the Human Resource Officers who do not 
desire to serve as a Training Officer will see a higher job fit because they will be more 
likely to serve in billets that they do desire.  
Input 11 Navy Performance: Measuring the overall performance of the Navy 
under these different COAs is a very difficult task due to time and experimentation 
restrictions. For the first COA, we can reasonably assume that if nothing is changed there 
will be no effect. Thus, under the first COA we can assume there is zero change. In order 
to accurately measure the change in performance in COAs 2 &3, we would need to 
conduct an experiment where we made the changes to roughly half of the CRUDES ships 
and measured their performance over a multi-tour period of time. Since we are limited in 
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both time and money, we cannot conduct this experiment. We can however estimate the 
change based on prior literature reviews and the results of our survey. 
After analyzing the results of our cost-benefit analysis, we identified interesting 
findings. Both COAs 2 and 3 bring an increased direct cost to the Navy largely through 
the cost associated with paying an additional 83 officers to fill the Training Officer billet. 
Adding personnel to any situation will bring an increased cost. The interesting finding 
was largely focused on the retention within the Surface Community. The significant 
increase in retention will likely result in a decrease in the Department Head Retention 
Bonus (DHRB) due to SWOs having increased job fit and a reduced desire to leave the 
Navy. This increase in job fit has the potential to drastically counteract the increases 
identified in both COAs. The exact effect on retention is difficult to determine without 
extensive research; however, using Kristof-Brown’s (2005) findings we can estimate an 
increase in retention close to .46%. This would drastically impact the monetary gains 
identified under each COA. We can estimate the reduction in authorized SWO bonus is 
large enough to compensate for the cost increase in COA 2 and 3. Unfortunately, COA 3 
reduces the manning in the SWO community resulting in an increase in the retention 
bonus. This leads to the recommendation to adopt COA 2, due directly to the benefits 
outweighing the costs. Table 1 summarizes the costs and benefits of COA 2 and 3. 
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Table 3.   CBA Summary 
 
Costs per month for all CRUDES 
Navy
Personnel Cost Monetary Neg
Training Proficiency Non-Monetary Pos
Total
SWO Community
Job fit Non-Monetary Pos





Job fit Non-Monetary Pos





Navy Performance Non-Monetary N/A
Cost Total
moderate + slight -
(+$600,837) (+$21,829)












moderate + moderate +
(+$579,008) (0)




COA Differential from Status Quo
HR O-2 Addition HR O-2  Swap
Stakeholder Inputs Effect Benefit
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This thesis documents the findings of job fit as it relates to Training Officers 
aboard CRUDES and the analysis of filling such a billet with another designator. Over 
the course of our research, we analyzed the results of a phone survey conducted of 33 
TRAINOs currently filling the billet on a CRUDES. The results of the survey 
demonstrated that 42.4% of the respondents believe a HR Officer should fill the afloat 
TRAINO billet aboard CRUDES. Only 30.3% of respondents actually selected TRAINO 
as their number one billet choice prior to holding the billet. These factors reinforce the 
hypothesis that Surface Warfare Officers at the current rank may not believe intrinsically 
that they are the correct fit for the billet or may not receive much job satisfaction. Both of 
these outcomes correlate with potential retention issues.  
Additionally, our research method techniques involved a cost-benefit analysis 
consisting of three COAs. COA 1 was maintaining the status quo, which would see no 
change to costs or benefits. COA 2, the addition of a designated TRAINO billet filled by 
a HR Officer, increased personnel costs for the Navy by $579,800 per month and bonus 
pay (sea pay) for the HR community by $21,829 per month. Total costs increased by 
$600,837 per month. However, there were non-monetary benefits in adopting this COA, 
including a moderate increase in training proficiency for the Navy and Navy performance 
for citizen impact. Also, there was a significant increase in retention and slight increase in 
job-fit for the SWO community. The HR community saw slight increases in job fit and 
retention, while also increasing the size of the community by 83 billets. 
COA 2 saw a slight increase in total costs, $21,829 per month. There were also 
several non-monetary benefits. The Navy would see a moderate increase in training 
proficiency. In the SWO and HR communities, there would be a slight increase in job fit. 
Also in the HR community, there would be a slight increase in retention. The citizen 




Our research lent itself to several recommendations for both the short and long-
term solutions. As evident in many of the surveys of current CRUDES TRAINOs, it is 
paramount that the Navy updates the Training Officer course. This course in its current 
state regularly occurred as the number one reason that TRAINOs perceived inadequate in 
preparing to fulfill the billet. Currently, this course consists of a five-day evolution 
without the ability to cover all of the responsibilities of a TRAINO. By increasing the 
duration and content of the training, the Navy will be able to save man-hours lost when 
the TRAINO uses the trial-by-error method. The Navy must also incorporate a hands-on 
training approach within the course to all the management systems expected to be used 
by the TRAINO. Relying upon PowerPoint presentations does not pose an effective way 
to present all the information and experience needed. This would warrant accounts to be 
created prior to the course to grant the TRAINOs access to all systems and allow the 
TRAINOs to be able to follow along with the instructor. To accommodate this teaching 
style, the length of the course should be increased to 3 weeks. These changes will allow 
for ample time to present real problems that TRAINOs could face on a daily basis in a 
more hands-on approach and the ways or resources to correct them. 
In the long-term, the Navy should consider adding an additional billet aboard 
CRUDES; furthermore, the Navy should truly consider fulfilling that billet with a HR 
Officer. Instituting this change will alleviate problems within the SWO community with 
regard to an increase in job satisfaction, retention, and potential cost savings. The costs 
for this additional billet may represent an initial increase; however, this cost does align 
with the Navy vision and focus turning towards its training methods. With the recent 
collisions, it is imperative we take the right steps in making sure our personnel receive 
the correct and complete training at the right time. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis marks the beginning of the research on this particular topic within the 
Navy. The topic of job fit associated with TRAINOs should be looked at across the entire 
fleet. It should begin with the Surface Warfare community on smaller platforms but 
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should also expand to larger platforms such as littoral combat ships and amphibious 
assault ships. In addition, the Navy should conduct a feasibility study on the addition of 
HR Officers onboard CRUDES. As part of this feasibility study, the Navy should devise 
a type of modeling and simulation in order to further the research initiated by this thesis. 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY SOLICITATION LETTER 
Hello, 
 
We are conducting research as part of our Master’s of Science in Management program at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. Our project will assess if Surface Warfare Officers filling 
the Training Officer (TRAINO) billet are the correct designator to fill that type of billet. 
The data collected will be used to assess whether there would be a benefit in adding an 
additional billet aboard ships. It will help determine if there are ways to improve 
retention in the Surface Warfare Officer community. 
 
We are conducting a phone survey which will take approximately 10-20 minutes. We are 
interested in hearing your experiences and opinions about being a Training Officer 
aboard your ship. 
 
Participation in this study is anonymous and voluntary and you may change your mind 
and decide not to participate at any time, even after the research has started. All 
participant information will be kept confidential, identifying information will be removed 
and identities will be protected through the use of pseudonyms and secure data storage 
facilities. 
 
If you are willing to participate in this project, please reply to kjlupo@nps.edu or 
lmgroves@nps.edu to set up a time for the survey. All surveys must be completed by 1 
Mar 2018. The Principal Investigator for this project is Dr. Jesse Cunha, 650-492-0381 
jcunha@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns 




LT Kyle Lupo & LT Lucas Groves 
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